WHY U.S. BLUEFIN TUNA FISHERMEN ABIDE BY A “FLAWED” SYSTEM: UNDERSTANDING MOTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE
WHY U.S. BLUEFIN TUNA FISHERMEN ABIDE BY A “FLAWED” SYSTEM: UNDERSTANDING MOTIVES FOR COMPLIANCE
By Christopher Middleton Condit
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Teresa R. Johnson
A Lay Abstract of the Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Science (in Marine Policy) May 2012
Key words: Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna, Compliance, Rational Choice, Enforcement, Fisheries Management, Scientific Uncertainty
The Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) inhabits the North Atlantic Ocean, crosses international boundaries and is managed by both international and domestic entities. This thesis provides a description of the U.S. fishery and analyzes the behavior and perspectives of its stakeholders. I then present and answer the question: Why do U.S. bluefin tuna fishermen comply with strict management rules despite the strong incentives to cheat? I interviewed U.S. fishermen, scientists, managers and enforcement agents in an effort to gain perspectives of the fishery from all stakeholder groups. I provide background information about the bluefin tuna fishery. Then I present a review of theoretical literature dealing with common pool resource use. Finally the characteristics of the fishery are analyzed through the lens of rational choice theory. I suggest that the U.S. bluefin tuna fishery does not fit all of the characteristics of a community that would be expected to exhibit high rates of regulatory compliance. Managers and enforcement agents interviewed agree that the regulations placed on U.S. bluefin tuna fishermen are strict and that incentives to violate regulations are present. Additionally, while violations occur, most domestic fishermen obey the rules, in contrast to what is expected from rational choice theory. Current issues with bluefin tuna science, management and enforcement are described. I illustrate the process of both international and domestic management, along with the sources of distrust in managers by industry members. A comparison of western and eastern stock fishing fleets and perspectives on enforcement are described in detail. I propose that industry compliance is motivated primarily by economic factors, making it a rational decision to comply with the regulations, despite what many consider to be problems with science, management and enforcement.
