How to be a Scientifically Respectable "Property-Dualist"
Ran Lahav, Southern Methodist University and Niall Shanks, East Tennessee State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 211-232, ISSN 0271-0137
We argue that the so-called "property-dualist" theory of consciousness is consistent both with current neurobiological data and with modern theories of physics. The hypothesis that phenomenal properties are global properties that are irreducible to microphysical properties, whose role is to integrate information across large portions of the brain, is consistent with current neurobiological knowledge. These properties can exercise their integration function through action on microscopic structures in the neuron without violating the laws of quantum mechanics. Although we offer no positive argument for the existence of irreducibly global properties, the conclusion is that this view is a scientifically respectable hypothesis that deserves to be investigated.
Request for reprints should be sent to Ran Lahav, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas 75275.
A Plea for the Poetic Metaphor
Paul G. Muscari, State University College of New York at Glens Falls
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 233-246, ISSN 0271-0137
What is the future of the poetic figures in a technological and scientific world where a more restricted view appears to be emerging as to what is adequate and relevant about metaphors? What part should the radical trope play in a script where the figures that are heralded are usually those that are perceived as having practical importance, i.e., those that fill in the gaps of existing knowledge? It will be the intent of this paper to show that the current preoccupation of much of philosophy and psychology with structural explanation and cognitive theory has certainly contributed to establishing a coordinated and unified theory of metaphors, but left unto itself such a concern is severely limited and does not adequately explain the full potential of metaphorical expressions.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Paul G. Muscari, Ph.D., 28 Broadacres Road, Queensbury, New York 12804.
Quantum Mechanics and the Involvement of Mind
in the Physical World: A Response to Garrison
Douglas M. Snyder, Berkeley, California
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 247-258, ISSN 0271-0137
Garrison's recent article is the background for discussing a number of issues. Among these issues are (1) the nature of probability in quantum mechanics; (2) the relation of observation to the wave packet in quantum mechanics; and (3) the role of immediate change upon measurement in the quantum mechanical wave function throughout space as the basis for the correlations among space-like separated events found in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen gedankenexperiment. A proposed empirical test of simultaneous, mutually exclusive situations (indicated by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's work) is discussed in the context of Stratton's work on the orientation of the visual field, and objects within it, upon inversion of the retinal image. The logical nature of simultaneous, mutually exclusive situations is discussed in the context of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas M. Snyder, Ph.D., 459 North Spaulding Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90036.
Turnabout on Consciousness: A Mentalist View
R.W. Sperry, California Institute of Technology
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 259-280, ISSN 0271-0137
Conceptual foundations for the changeover from behaviorism to mentalism are reviewed in an effort to better clarify frequently contested and misinterpreted features. The new mentalist tenets which I continue to support have been differently conceived to be a form of dualism, mind-brain identity theory, functionalism, nonreductive physical monism, dualist interactionism, emergent interactionism, and various other things. This diversity and contradiction are attributed to the fact that the new mentalist paradigm is a distinctly new position that fails to fit traditional philosophic dichotomies. Formerly opposed features from previous polar alternatives become merged into a novel unifying synthesis, an unambiguous description of which demands redefinition of old terms or/and the invention of new terminology. The present analysis and interpretation are backed by statements from the early papers.
Requests for reprints should be sent to R.W. Sperry, Ph.D., California Institute of Technology 156-29, Pasadena, California 91125.
Intentionality, Consciousness, and Subjectivity
Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 281-308, ISSN 0271-0137
Searle restricted intrinsic intentionality (intentional contents, aspectual shapes) to occurrent neurophysiological states that are conscious in the sense that their owner has awareness of them when they occur; all occurrent nonconscious states of the brain have, at most, a derivative intentionality by reliably producing, unless obstructed, conscious intentional states. The grounds for thus restricting intrinsic intentionality are explored, and traced to Searle's conviction that aspectual shapes (intentional contents) must be "manifest" whenever actually exemplified by an instance of any mental brain-occurrence. By "manifest," Searle seems to mean that aspectual shapes must be not only contents but also, at the same time, objects of the very states whose contents they are. This is accomplished due to the self-intimating character of all conscious states, that is, their individually including awareness of the state itself. The question is why manifestation in this sense is necessary for an occurrent mental state to possess intentionality. Why cannot an occurrent (nonconscious) mental state possess intentionality without also "manifesting" the aspectual shape that it exemplifies? If contents (including aspectual shapes) depend for existence on the individual's being aware, why must this be inner rather than outer awareness? Why can the essential awareness not be awareness of something outside the mental state, rather than awareness of the state's intentional content itself? Outer awareness should be able to accomplish in this regard all that inner awareness can accomplish.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, California 95616.
Book Review ª Mending Minds: A Guide to
the New Psychiatry of Depression, Anxiety, and Other Serious Mental Disorders
Leonard L. Heston. New York: Freeman, 1992,
Reviewed by William E. Roweton, Chadron State College
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 309-310, ISSN 0271-0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] Leonard L. Heston, M.D. is a Professor of Psychiatry at The University of Washington and is the Director of The Washington Institute for Mental Illness Training and Research. Dr. Heston writes about "a QUIET revolution [which] has been occurring in psychiatry" (p. 1). Dr. Heston's "new psychiatry" focuses on the "actual study of the brain as a biologic tissue" (p. 3) and avoids "elaborate theorizing, guru-isms, blaming of mothers for unhappiness, backbiting among contending schools, or [popular and simple] prescriptions for instant mental health. Such topics were a product of prescience..." (p. 4). Heston wishes to distance himself from traditional Freudianism. Most importantly, according to Heston, his biological and scientific psychiatry portends greater hope for the "nearly one person in five [who] will develop a major psychiatric illness..." (p. 1).
Requests for reprints should be sent to William E. Roweton, Ph.D., Professor of Education and Psychology, Chadron State College, Chadron, Nebraska 69337.
Book Review ª Interdisciplinarity: History,
Theory, and Practice
Julie Thompson Klein. Detroit: Wayne State University, 1991
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Summer 1992, Volume 13, Number 3, Pages 311-314, ISSN 0271-0137
Reviewed by John J. DeWitt, Wayne State University
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] U.S. Higher Education is generally recognized as the best in the post-contemporary world, thanks to increased democratization of access, inter-institutional competition, and "consumer choice." Paradoxically, planned institutional change, effectively implemented in general education and in research at the most fundamental levels is of critical importance because of epochal change occurring right now, due primarily to technology, the continuous information explosion, and ethnic emergencies.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John J. DeWitt, Division of Theoretical and Behavioral Foundations, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan 48202.