The Journal of Mind and Behavior
Volume 19, Number 1, Winter 1998
The Case for Intrinsic Theory: III. Intrinsic Inner
Awareness and the Problem of Straightforward Objectivation
Thomas Natsoulas, University of California, Davis
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 1—20, ISSN 0271—0137
Aron Gurwitsch, phenomenologist and intrinsic theorist of consciousness4, contends that every objectivating mental act necessarily involves inner awareness; whenever an objectivating act occurs, it is an intentional object of unmediated apprehension. Moreover, inner awareness is literally intrinsic to every objectivating mental act, a part of its very own individual structure. Gurwitsch further argues that inner awareness is a merely concomitant part of that structure, taking place at the margin of the particular objectivating act, for the reason that the content of inner awareness is not relevant to the content of the thematic process at the core of the act. However, Gurwitsch assigns an essential function to inner awareness by virtue of its content; namely, it helps to constitute the respective objectivating act as a unitary phenomenon over time. Perhaps, therefore, theoretically relegating inner awareness to the margin of an objectivating act amounts merely to an effort to allow for straightforward objectivation without falling into inconsistency. That is, some objectivating acts seem not to include inner awareness and, presumably, this would be explained by reference to intrinsic inner awareness that is no more than concomitant, as opposed to its being interwoven with outer awareness taking place in the central area of an objectivating act.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Thomas Natsoulas, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, California 95616—8686. Send e-mail messages to <email@example.com>.
Analysis of Adverse Behavioral Effects of Benzodiazepines With a Discussion on Drawing Scientific Conclusions from the FDA’s Spontaneous Reporting System
Peter R. Breggin, Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 21—50, ISSN 0271—0137
The benzodiazepines can produce a wide variety of abnormal mental responses and hazardous behavioral abnormalities, including rebound anxiety and insomnia, mania and other forms of psychosis, paranoia, violence, antisocial acts, depression, and suicide. These drugs can impair cognition, especially memory, and can result in confusion. They can induce dependence and addiction. Severe withdrawal syndromes with psychosis, seizures, and death can develop. The short-acting benzodiazepines, alprazolam (Xanax) and triazolam (Halcion), are especially prone to cause psychological and behavioral abnormalities. The sources of data to support these observations and conclusions are discussed in regard to the scientific method. These adverse drug effects can wreck havoc in the lives of individuals and their families.
Much of the material in this report has previously appeared as a chapter in Peter R. Breggin’s Brain-Disabling Treatments in Psychiatry (New York, © Springer Publishing Company, 1997). It is reproduced by permission of Springer Publishing Company. Requests for reprints should be sent to Peter R. Breggin, M.D., Center for the Study of Psychiatry and Psychology, 4628 Chestnut Street, Bethesda, Maryland 20814.
Robert M. Francescotti, San Diego State University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 51—64, ISSN 0271—0137
Over the past three decades, non-reductionism has become a dominant position in the philosophy of mind. In its standard formulations, this position implies that mental properties are not identical with physical properties. Most non-reductionists, however, still pledge their allegiance to physicalism (or materialism) by insisting that mental properties supervene on, and are realized by, purely physical phenomena. I argue that the supervenience and realization theses are not strong enough to ensure physicalism regarding the mind unless they are taken to imply that mental properties are, in fact, identical with physical properties. I conclude by showing how my critique of non-reductive physicalism compares with that of Jaegwon Kim.
Requests for reprints should be sent to R. M. Francescotti, Ph.D., Department of Philosophy, San Diego State University, San Diego, California 92182—8142.
The Physics of Metaphysics: Personal Musings
Aleksandra Kasuba, New York City, New York
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 65—90, ISSN 0271—0137
It is suggested that feelings, emotions, reasoning, or remembering, when seen as manifestations of one continuous energy flow, are energy events that differentiate by the intensity and direction in which the energy moves. The flow, initiated by the energy exchange that sustains existence, in passing through a human being lends itself to manipulation, certain faculties regulating its release back into the surroundings. When undisturbed, the energy flow is guided by attraction, and taking the path of least resistance, falls into a system of energy movements that engages the different mental faculties in turn. Part I describes the system, tracing the progression of mental energy events from the simplest at the core to the complex in the enveloping layers of energy movements. Part II describes the changes the system undergoes when circumstances, survival needs, convention, and a sense of self exert an influence.
The author is an artist working in large scale architectural commissions. Her work in tensile fabric structures was featured in The New York Times, The New Yorker, and professional publications in the United States and abroad. She has received a National Endowment for the Arts Fellowship, and the IFAI International Award for Excellence, with FTL Associates. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Aleksandra Kasuba, 110 East 87 Street, Apartment 2C, New York City, New York 10128.
Book Review > Divided Minds and Successive Selves: Ethical Issues in Disorders of Identity and Personality
Jennifer Radden. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996
Reviewed by Christian Perring, Dowling College
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 91—102, ISSN 0271—0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] Exactly when Philosophy of Psychiatry started as a subfield of Philosophy is hard to say. There are several different estimates of how old psychiatry itself is, from one hundred to three hundred years, and of course there has been discussion and treatment of mental illness for at least a couple of thousand years. A host of issues which could count as belonging to the field have been discussed just within the last hundred years. For instance, a large literature on the philosophy of psychoanalysis dates back to the beginning of the century, and in the last thirty years there has been discussion of amnesia and multiple personality in the philosophy of mind, bioethical debate about involuntary hospitalization and the ability of the mentally ill to give informed consent to drug trials, and recent continental philosophy has shown much interest in madness, civilization, capitalism and schizophrenia. However, I suggest that Philosophy of Psychiatry reached a sense of itself as a separate field only in the 1990s. In this time, it has gained its own association, journal, and a book series with a prestigious press. I refer to the American Association for Philosophy and Psychiatry, the associated journal, Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, and the MIT Press series, Philosophical Psychopathology: Disorders of Mind, edited by Owen Flanagan and George Graham. Jennifer Radden's Divided Minds and Successive Selves is the first book in that series.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Christian Perring, Ph.D., Philosophy and Religious Studies, Dowling College, Oakdale, New York 11769 or via e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org.
Book Review > Experimental Psychology, Methods of Research (seventh edition)
F.J. McGuigan. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1997
Reviewed by Marie J. Hayes, University of Maine
The Journal of Mind and Behavior, Winter 1998, Vol. 19, No. 1, Pages 103—104, ISSN 0271—0137
[Note: First paragraph, no abstract available.] Teaching experimental methods to psychology students is one of the great puzzles of the academic experience. There is a constant tradeoff between the "real story" and one that is accessible to students who have, for the most part, never done any serious research. McGuigan’s Experimental Psychology, Methods of Research is an attempt to address the tradeoff between didactic communication and the logical subtlety that is of course the basic attraction of the research endeavor in the first place.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Marie J. Hayes, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, University of Maine, 5742 Little Hall, Orono, Maine 04469—5742.