The Journal of Mind and Behavior
Volume 21, Numbers 3, Summer 2000
This paper summarizes the longstanding debate over psychology's
fragmentation by illustrating two principal impediments to the
fostering of consensus and unity. The paper then discusses the
important benefits of past dialogue concerning these issues,
suggesting that some progress has been made in dealing with problems
of disunity and fragmentation, particularly at the metatheoretical
and philosophical levels. This general discussion then forms the
backdrop for the following articles, which together form a single
argument in favor of a hermeneutic approach to the problem of
fragmentation.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Stephen C. Yanchar, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602. E-mail: stephen_yanchar@byu.edu.
This article examines the relationship between unity and progress in
psychology. It contends that psychologists have traditionally sought
unity in order to fulfill positivistic criteria of progress and
success. In accordance with innovations in the philosophy of science,
and in accordance with recent trends toward methodological pluralism,
such unity is neither required nor recommended. However, a problem
that arises under the new philosophy of science &emdash;
incommensurability &emdash; must also be addressed. It is argued that
before psychology can be a coherent (though pluralistic) discipline,
three important questions pertaining to incommensurability must be
answered
Requests for reprints should be sent to Stephen C. Yanchar, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84604. E-mail: stephen_yanchar@byu.edu.
The question of incommensurability is an overlooked issue that has
profound consequences for our ability to understand relationships and
utilize common standards for comparison, contrast, and evaluation in
psychology. Are the differences among discourse communities so deep
that there is no common "commensurate" &emdash; no common measuring
stick for making comparisons among communities? If so, then the
community of communities, the discipline of psychology, has no way to
compare competing knowledge claims, and no way to effect disciplinary
unity and coherence. Kuhn's distinction between incommensurability
and incompatibility is described, along with its challenge to
Enlightenment rationality and scientific method for brokering the
relativity among discourse communities. Popper's misconception that
this challenge implies an "anything goes" nihilism is also discussed,
specifically his misconception that incompatibility and
incommensurability mean incomparability. On the contrary, the article
shows how recognizing the incommensurable is often the key to
comparison, and thus disciplinary coherence and unity.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Brent D. Slife, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602. E-mail: brent_slife@byu.edu
This paper argues that unification in the discipline of psychology
cannot be achieved through appeals to objectivism or relativism.
Objectivism fails because it bills itself as a value-free tool of
inquiry, when in reality it is a value-laden metatheory. Relativism
fails because it cannot make judgments among communities, and as such
is a candidate for disunity, not unity. We argue that any attempt to
unify the discipline must begin at the level of moral assumptions.
Morality serves as the ground on which evaluations of divergent
discourse communities can and must take place. A disciplinary
conversation is required in which various moral systems are
considered as unifying strategies. We outline how a productive
conversation of this sort can take place.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Kristoffer B. Kristensen, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602.
Considerable fragmentation, and awareness of it, have characterized
the field of psychology since its inception. It is suggested that
over the years, efforts to reduce uncertainty and overcome
fragmentation in psychology have clustered around two broad, opposite
strategies which might be termed "scientism" and "constructionism."
The first wishes to rely on secure methods and controlled
experimentation, the second on a postmodern acceptance of radical
heterogeneity and "no truth through method." Some of the shortcomings
of these strategies are discussed. A hermeneutic approach centering
on dialogue and the idea of social inquiry as a kind of ethical
practice is outlined which, it is argued, might have success in
incorporating some of the virtues and avoiding the pitfalls of other
responses to the problem of fragmentation.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Frank C. Richardson, Ph.D., Department of Educational Psychology, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, Texas 78712. E-mail: frank.richardson@mail.utexas.edu
In reaction to the other papers in this special issue, the
philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer is further
clarified, especially with respect to the ethical sense evident in
Gadamer's work, and in that of a younger generation of critical
hermeneuts. This discussion sets the stage for a critical questioning
of the ability of psychologists, given their past and current
disciplinary and professional horizons, to engage a hermeneutic
solution to the problem of fragmentation in psychology.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jack Martin, Ph.D., Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada, V5A 1S6.
This article provides a broad outline of a hermeneutic unity of
psychology, by way of a reply to Martin's comment (2000, this issue).
It is argued that the metaphysical and ontological impasses that
concern Martin may occur because of two reasons &emdash; genuine
incomparability or the lack of motivation on the part of potential
interlocutors. We argue that neither of these reasons necessarily
precludes the dialogue and evaluation called for under this
hermeneutic approach. We then show how a proper understanding of
dialogue, as well as a group of psychologists to facilitate this
dialogue &emdash; theoretical psychologists &emdash; are keys to a
coherent and unified, yet pluralistic and responsive psychology.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Stephen C. Yanchar, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah 84602. E-mail: stephen_yanchar@byu.edu