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The Layering of the Psyche: Philosophy,
Psychiatry, and Difference
Grant Gillett,
University of Otago
Freud, working from a background in clinical neurology and against a backdrop of burgeoning
theory development in biology and neurophysiology, thought that the layers of
the mind mirrored the layers of the brain although he was well aware of the conceptual
problems involved in trying to identify the two. His associationist view, based on a neurobiological
and evolutionary approach to the mind tends to underestimate the role of consciousness
in a holistic conception of the psyche. The role of language and the disciplines
and practices which structure the psyche make it a domain in which negotiated solutions
to life challenges are produced from the socio-cultural resources of discourse applied to the
biological propensities resulting from innate dispositions and learning history. Although
the biological and social realms obey fundamentally different rules, their psychological
effects are realised in a common medium — the brain — a fact that can be detached
from reductive approaches to psychology or psychiatry and can give substance to the
(post-structural) idea of the body being inscribed like a surface on which events have left
their trace.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Grant Gillett, Dr. Phil., M.D., FRS, Bioethics Centre,
Dunedin School of Medicine, University of Otago, P.O. Box 913, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand.
Email: grant.gillett@otago.ac.nz
On the Methodology of Physics: Cognizing Physical
Phenomena and the Genesis and Termination of Time
Uri Fidelman, Technion, Israel Institute
of Technology
The methodology of physics is discussed. The limitations of the empirical method are
exposed, and it is argued that these limitations are related to our sensory input. The limitations
of mathematics and of the representation of physical theories by mathematical
models are also examined. An alternative methodology, the establishing of physical models
on neuropsychology, is suggested and demonstrated. A cognitive psychological model of
the genesis and the termination of time is explored.
Requests for reprints should be sent to
Uri Fidelman, Ph.D., Department of Humanities and
Arts, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel. Email: uf@tx.technion.ac.il
Distributed Mental Models: Mental Models in
Distributed Cognitive Systems
Adrian P. Banks and Lynne J. Millward, University
of Surrey
The function of groups as information processors is increasingly being recognised in a
number of theories of group cognition. A theme of many of these is an emphasis on sharing
cognition. This paper extends current conceptualisations of groups by critiquing the
focus on shared cognition and emphasising the distribution of cognition in groups. In
particular, it develops an account of the distribution of one cognitive construct, mental
models. Mental models have been chosen as a focus because they are used in a number of
theories of high level cognition from different areas of research such as cognitive science
and human factors and so the implication of this development is wide reaching. This
paper reviews the unconnected literatures on distributed cognition and mental models and
integrates them in order to extend the theory of mental models to distributed cognitive
systems such as groups. The distributed cognition literature is reviewed and the importance
of considering the group as single cognitive system is adopted. A range of mental
model theories are reviewed leading to the conclusion that they all have, in some form,
the central feature of a mapping onto the cognitive system. Combining these two ideas,
it is proposed that the model can be a mapping onto the whole group, if the information
is distributed appropriately and the connections between parts of the model maintained
through communication. This cognitive construct is referred to as a distributed mental
model. Implications and applications of this theory are discussed.
Request for reprints should be sent to Adrian P. Banks, Department of Psychology, University
of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH, United Kingdom. Email: a.banks@surrey.ac.uk
Consciousness and Self-Regulation
Frederic Peters, Armidale, Australia
The mystery surrounding consciousness as subjectivity dissipates dramatically
when understood in its biological context. The core characteristics
of consciousness can be seen to derive from its functionality, and the
fundamental function of cognition, given the equivalence of mental activity
and brain process, is to advance the survival and thus the self-regulative
capacity of the organism of which the brain is a part. These core elements
of consciousness are comprised of a self-locational data structure which
serves to configure ongoing experience in terms of controllable spatial
and temporal parameters, and a processing regime for this orientational
schema which has evolved from the feedback architecture necessary for
regulating behavior in relation to homeostatic needs. These two self-regulative
constituents yield a primitive form of consciousness as subjectivity
— simple reflexive awareness — which provides the basis for the subsequent
development of metacognitive mechanisms which monitor and control the
cognitive processes which regulate behavior in relation to metabolic
requirements.
Request for reprints should be sent to
Frederic Peters, Ph.D., P.O. Box 379, Armidale NSW 2350, Australia.
Email: fhpeters@aapt.net.au
Guidance, Selection, and
Representation: Response to Anderson and Rosenberg
Tom Roberts, University of Edinburgh
Anderson and Rosenberg’s (2008) guidance theory of representation
offers an analysis of mental content that strongly emphasises the influence
that intentional states have upon the production and modulation of bodily
behavior. On this view, a mental state gains both its status as a representation,
and its content, in virtue of occupying a particular role in the guidance
of action. I present three related challenges for the guidance theory,
before defending an alternative model that is grounded not in action-guidance,
but in action-selection. Firstly, I argue that the guidance
theory fails to explain an important category of perceptual misrepresentation.
Secondly, I propose that the content ascriptions predicted by the theory
are not sufficiently determinate. Thirdly, I propose that the contents
implicated by the guidance view do not match those that are naturally
ascribed in the explanation of intentionally-directed behavior. The
modified account that I develop responds to these concerns, and suggests
that representational states depict affordance properties: the opportunities
and obstacles that the subject’s environment offers for the pursuit
of goals and plans.
Request for reprints should be sent to
Tom Roberts, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, University of Edinburgh,
Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh, Scotland, United
Kingdom EH8 9AD. Email: tom.roberts@ed.ac.uk
Affordances and Intentionality: Reply to Roberts
Michael L. Anderson and Anthony Chemero, Franklin & Marshall College
In this essay we respond to some criticisms of the guidance theory of representation
offered by Tom Roberts. We argue that although Roberts’ criticisms miss their mark, he
raises the important issue of the relationship between affordances and the action-oriented
representations proposed by the guidance theory. Affordances play a prominent role in the
anti-representationalist accounts offered by theorists of embodied cognition and ecological
psychology, and the guidance theory is motivated in part by a desire to respond to the
critiques of representationalism offered in such accounts, without giving up entirely on the
idea that representations are an important part of the cognitive economy of many animals.
Thus, explorations of whether and how such accounts can in fact be related and reconciled
potentially offer to shed some light on this ongoing controversy. Although the current essay
hardly settles the larger debate, it does suggest that there may be more possibility for agreement
than is often supposed.
Request for reprints should be sent to
Michael L. Anderson, Department of Psychology,
Franklin & Marshall College, P.O. Box 3003, Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17604–3003. Email:
michael.anderson@fandm.edu
Critical Notice
Supersizing the Mind:
Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Andy
Clark. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, 286 pages, $35.00 hardcover.
Reviewed by Reviewed by Robert D. Rupert,
University of Colorado, Boulder
For well over two decades, Andy Clark has been gleaning
theoretical lessons from the leading edge of cognitive science, applying
a combination of empirical savvy and philosophical instinct that few
can match. Clark’s most recent book, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment,
Action, and Cognitive Extension, brilliantly expands his oeuvre.
It offers a well-informed and focused survey of research in the burgeoning
field of situated cognition, a field that emphasizes the contribution
of environmental and non-neural bodily structures to the production
of intelligent behavior. The situated research program, fledgling though
it may be in some respects, has reached an age at which its philosophical
stock can reasonably be taken; and Clark is just the person to take
it. Supersizing the Mind consists of three main divisions.
The first develops the case for the distinctively extended view of cognition,
according to which the human mind or cognitive system (or human cognitive
states or processes) literally comprises elements beyond the boundary
of the human organism. The second responds to critics of the extended
outlook: Frederick Adams, Kenneth Aizawa, Keith Butler, Brie Gertler,
Rick Grush, and me, among others. The third major division evaluates
nonextended strands in the situated program, in particular, those that
emphasize the role of the non-neural body in cognition.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert D. Rupert, Ph.D.,
Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, UCB 232, Boulder, Colorado 80309–0232.
Email: rupertr@colorado.edu
Book Reviews
The Case Against Adolescence:
Rediscovering the Adult in Every Teen.. Robert
Epstein. Sanger, California: Linden Publishing, 2007, 490 pages, $24.95
hardcover. Reviewed by Hans A. Skott–Myhre,
Brock University
The Case Against Adolescence: Rediscovering the
Adult in Every Teen by Robert Epstein is both a profoundly important
and problematic contribution to the literature on the social construction
of adolescence. It is important, because it adds new and substantial
data from the discipline of psychology, which until the advent of this
book has not, as a discipline, ventured into this area to this degree.
It is problematic, because it overvalues adulthood and holds a peculiar
nostalgia for a world of young people and adults that may never have
existed.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Hans Skott–Myhre,
Ph.D., Child and Youth Studies, Brock University, 500 Glenridge, St.
Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1 Canada. Email: hskottmy@brocku.ca
Cambridge Handbook
of Computational Psychology. Ron
Sun [Editor]. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008, 753 pages.
$65.00 soft cover. Reviewed by Robert
L. West, Carleton University
Computational psychology refers to the effort to create computational mechanisms
that, in some way, mimic mechanisms within the brain. More specifically, the goal in
creating these mechanisms is to show that they can systematically reproduce patterns
of human behaviour elicited under specific conditions. From this it is inferred that
these mechanisms bare some similarity to the brain mechanisms that produced the
human behaviours. In most cases this involves mimicking the results of psychology
experiments, although it is good to see in this book, two chapters discussing the application
of this approach to non experimental areas (multi agent social interactions and
cognitive engineering).
Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert West, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Carleton
University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, K1S 5B6. Email: robert_west@carleton.ca |
