The Journal of Mind and Behavior

Volume 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Spring and Summer 1986 ~ Special Issue, Part 1: Perspective

Cognitive Psychology and Dream Research: Historical, Conceptual, and Epistemological Considerations
Robert E. Haskell, University of New England
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Spring and Summer 1986, Vol. 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Pages 131 [1]-160 [30], ISSN 0271-0137, ISBN 0-930195-02-7
Historical, conceptual, methodological, and epistemological factors in the development of dream research are outlined and discussed, along with four stages of dream research. Issues evolving from the analysis are examined in relation to cognitive psychology and the philosophy of science, among them disciplinary boundary problems, reductionistic approaches, the importance of dreams and dreaming as cognitive data, the concept of levels of analysis, cognitive operations, and meaning in dreams. Implications for future research are discussed.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Robert E. Haskell, Ph.D., University of New England, 11 Hills Beach Road, Biddeford, Maine 04005.

An Empirical Foundation for a Self Psychology of Dreaming
Harry Fiss, University of Connecticut, School of Medicine
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Spring and Summer 1986, Vol. 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Pages 161 [31]-192 [62], ISSN 0271-0137, ISBN 0-930195-02-7
While the impact of sleep research on clinical practice has been nothing short of spectacular, the influence dream research has had on clinical practice has been negligible. Consequently, a wide gap exists today between the dream researcher and the dream interpreter. The reason for this gap is that dream researchers have by and large been overemphasizing the biological underpinnings of dreaming sleep and have paid insufficient attention to dreaming as a subjective experience. In this chapter, results will be presented which are not only scientifically sound and rigorous, but which also address themselves to the interests of the practitioner. Findings will be discussed from the perspective of Kohut's self psychology, with which they are strikingly consistent. Laboratory evidence will be presented demonstrating that dreaming serves three primary functions: (1) the maintenance of self-cohesiveness, (2) the restoration of a crumbling or fragmenting self, and (3) the development of new psychic structures. Examples will also be presented to indicate how future research can further advance a clinically relevant experimental self psychology of dreaming.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Harry Fiss, Ph.D., Department of Psychiatry, University of Connecticut Health Center, School of Medicine, Farmington, Connecticut 06032.

Dreaming: Cortical Activation and Perceptual Thresholds
John S. Antrobus, The City College of the City University of New York
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Spring and Summer 1986, Vol. 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Pages 193 [63]-212 [82], ISSN 0271-0137, ISBN 0-930195-02-7
It is proposed that (1) cortical activation and (2) heightened sensory thresholds are sufficient to (a) account for the particular characterstics of the Stage 1 REM dream report; (b) that these two variables modify certain characteristics of normal waking thought to produce dreamlike mentation; and (c) that no additional special cognitive operations are required to account for dreamlike mentation in Stage 1 REM. This paper attempts to specify what cognitive and neurological characteristics are required to distinguish waking mentation in noisy and understimulated environments from sleep mentation during different levels of cortical activation, namely Stages 1 REM and 2.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John S. Antrobus, Ph.D., Department of Psychology, City University of New York, Convent Avenue at 138th Street, New York, New York 10031.

Some Relations Between the Cognitive Psychology of Dreams and Dream Phenomenology
Harry T. Hunt, Brock University
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Spring and Summer 1986, Vol. 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Pages 213 [83]-228 [98], ISSN 0271-0137, ISBN 0-930195-02-7
Cognitive approaches to dreams are limited by the conceptual and methodological narrowness of current "cognitive science," obscuring the actual multiplicity of dream experience. While there may be nothing essentially or uniquely dreamlike, this very multiplicity could have a liberating effect on cognitive theory, by calling attention to the need for a psychology of visual imagination and metaphor and by reinforcing recent views on the multiplicity of waking consciousness.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Harry T. Hunt, Ph.D., Brock University, Department of Psychology, St. Catharines, Ontario L2S 3A1, Canada.

REM Slep and Neural Nets
Francis Crick, The Salk Institute and Graeme Mitchison, Kenneth Craik Laboratory, Cambridge, England
The Journal of Mind and Behavior , Spring and Summer 1986, Vol. 7, Numbers 2 and 3, Pages 229 [99]-250 [120], ISSN 0271-0137, ISBN 0-930195-02-7
The broad features of Rapid Eye Movement (REM) sleep are reviewed. Memory storage in the brain is probably quite unlike that in a digital computer, being distributed, superimposed and robust. Such memory systems are easily overloaded. If the stored memories share common features, random stimulation often produces mixed outputs. Simulations show that such overloading can be reduced by a process we call "reverse learning." We propose that this process is what is happening in REM sleep and that it explains in an unforced manner the condensation commonly found in dreams. Evidence for and against the proposed theory is discussed and several alternative theories are briefly described. The absence of REM sleep in the Enchidna and in two species of dolphins (that have relatively large brains) suggests that REM may allow the brain to be smaller than if REM were lacking.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Francis Crick, Ph.D., The Salk Institute, P.O. Box 85800, San Diego, California 92138.