The rejection of an enduring self in Buddhism but also of personal identity by David Hume and Derek Parfit, and the postulate of selflessness by contemporary cognitive science has brought to the foreground the questions of continuity, responsibility, and subjective agency as well as their ethical, soteriological, and ethical ramifications with previously unknown urgency raising questions such as "How can we conceive of such a selfless self?î and ìWhat is the extent of its conceptual implications?" This paper will develop a conception of personhood based on Nishida Kitaro's conception of the dialectical self, which addresses these questions and suggests an alternative to the notion of personal identity by applying the notion of temporality to the conception of personhood.

In order to accomplish this task, the paper will briefly introduce the problematic of personal identity and, then, develop a response to the underlying questions of continuity and identify in the light ofNishida's three-fold concept of time as "contradictory self-identity" (Jap.: mujunteki jiko doitsu), as ìcontinuity of discontinuity" (Jap.: hirenzoku no renzoku), and as "eternal presentî (Jap.: eien no genzai). Such a discussion will not only disclose Nishida's conception of self but also relate and apply the perennial definitions of the no self (Jap.: muga) as a self beyond individuality and beyond the dichotomy between subject and object characteristic of Zen to a contemporary philosophy of personhood and self. Methodologically, the paper will apply a phenomenological approach. 

I believe, the contribution of the paper will be fourfold: (i) In recent years there has been lot of work applying Zen thought and "logic" to philosophical issues. However, to my knowledge, Zen notion of self or, better, no-self (Jap.: muga) has not yet been applied to the problem of personal identity. In his excellent Zen Action - Zen Person, Kasulis briefly addresses the Zen conception of person as "presence" but does not relate this concept to the central questions of personal identity: What is the source for our experience of continuity? What is the role of freedom and causality? How can these processes be conceptualized? (ii) This paper will formulate a conception of personhood based on Nishida's dialectical philosophy. (iii) Nishida's philosophy will provide an alternative to the notion of personal identity which not only does justice to both Parfit's ingenious undermining of personal identity and to the ethical and experiential dimensions of this concept but also accommodates Ricoeur's notion of a narrative identity. In addition, I believe that Nishida provides a hermeneutical schema to understand various conceptions of personal identity. (iv) It will advance not only a comparative philosophy and contribute to methodological considerations concerning comparative philosophy but also contribute to the general understanding of personhood and the conceptual issues involved in this enterprise.