SESSION F: Part II

Connecting Science and Policy
Travis Wagner, Department of Environmental Science, University of Southern Maine

"Science cannot resolve moral conflicts, but it can help to more accurately frame the debates about those conflicts." - Heinz Pagels (1988)

The purpose of this brief essay is to provide a primer for the panel discussion on connecting science and policy at the upcoming Maine Water Conference. The essay is intended solely as background information and is not intended to be a complete examination of the issue.

What is the connection between science and policy?
In contemporary environmental policy, there have been three major phases in the evolution of the connection between science and policy. In the first phase, science was viewed as the primary driver in tackling environmental problems. In the second phase, the prominence of science diminished as socioeconomic factors increased in importance. We are in the third phase, the conflict over an increased role of the precautionary principle versus scientific certainty.

First Phase - 1970s
The nation's and states' initial legislative efforts to control environmental degradation were science-based. In the initial clean air, clean water, and natural resource protection acts, science was relied upon to identify and solve environmental problems. As Anthony Downs1 (1972) argued, underlying this initial approach was the optimistic American tradition that a technological solution is initially assumed to be possible for nearly every problem. The connection between scientific knowledge and policy was thought to be clear.

Second Phase - 1980 to 1992
Following the initial legislative efforts focusing on scientific and technological solutions, the connection between science and policy changed. Science no longer was the dominant factor in determining which environmental problems to address and how to solve them. The stakes of policy decisions were recognized to be high as they result in two primary outcomes: restriction of rights or reallocation of resources. It was realized that environmental decisions are not solely science based, but socio-politically based. This shift in recognition was caused by two primary factors. First, as many environmental historians note, there was increasing realization of the high cost of solving environmental problems. The costs were direct (e.g., pollution control costs, monitoring and enforcement costs) and indirect (e.g., modifying behavior). Second, related to the cost factor, was the growing recognition that scientific understanding of environmental problems was far more complex than previously thought. Paradoxically, the more we studied environmental processes and problems, the less certain we became of the causes, effects, and more importantly, consequences of action and inaction. The importance and value of science had not diminished, per se, but decision-making thrives on certainty, something that science can rarely deliver. The reduced reliance on science created a vacuum in the policy process where other factors, especially economic, were able to gain in importance.

Third Phase - 1992 to Present
Public officials, the regulated community, and the public crave certainty in understanding and solving environmental problems. Certainty does not exist in science as we only can disprove, but never prove with certainty. Instead, science can provide probabilities and confidence levels. This presents a conflict in policy: the need for scientific certainty compared to the limitations of science. Emblematic of this conflict in policymaking is the role of the precautionary principle.

In 1992, the precautionary principle was inserted into the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development:

"Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."

The precautionary principle represents a paradigm shift in decision-making. Supporters argue that it is common sense; our current maxim governing technology of "innocent until proven guilty" has and will cause unacceptable and irreversible damage to the environment. In contrast, opponents charge that the "guilty until proven innocent" of the precautionary principle imposes a near impossible burden to demonstrate and discriminates against new technologies, which have high social benefit potential.

Over the last 10 years, there has been increasing polarization between the supporters and opponents of the precautionary principle and its place in policy. As supporters seek its adoption, opponents, under the sound science banner, insist that public policy should be risk-based. This approach is predicated on the assumption that our efforts should focus only on real, not perceived or estimated risks as determined by sound scientific evidence and an assessment of risk. Intuitively, this is a rational approach: control those problems where there is a significant risk to human health and the environment rather than spend valuable resources on non-existent or low risks.

Regardless of how sound the scientific evidence is, environmental risk assessment is fraught with uncertainty. Relative to the number of new chemicals synthesized and produced each year, there is a high level of uncertainty regarding acute and chronic toxicity because we lack data in general and lack data specifically for the vast majority of chemicals. We have even less knowledge regarding the effects of chemical interactions in organisms and the environment. Our knowledge of fate and transport and exposure is sparse, but growing. However, knowledge regarding effects in sensitive sub-populations, role of lifestyle factors, and the secondary and tertiary ecological effects are extremely poor. We are not sure of the best way to address future risks. Yet, risk assessment is a crucial decision-making tool.

Public officials often are caught in the middle between competing demands on policy in the face of scientific uncertainty: protecting ecological and public health without unnecessarily stifling technological and economic progress. The increasing politicization of scientific uncertainty (e.g., global climate change) has only made public officials more wary to commit to action. To be sure, risk assessment is science-based and a powerful tool. But its inherent uncertainty limits its usefulness. To scientists, uncertainty is an inherent component of the scientific method, which drives the constant pursuit of "improvement" in knowledge. As science is dynamic, too often policy decisions are not. Science is only as certain as the knowledge of the time. The soundest science can be available at the time of policymaking, but new information later can reveal that the previous study is no longer sound. However, most regulations are made with available scientific information and are not designed to adjust to changing scientific information. By failing to design policy to be more flexible to changing scientific information, we create our own conflict over scientific uncertainty and policy.

Conclusion
The evolution of the connection between science and policy is more accurately characterized as an evolution in the treatment of scientific uncertainty in policymaking. Inherently, decisions must be made as to what environmental and public health problems are to be solved. As the stakes become higher, there is increasing conflict between those who demand the precautionary principle and those who insist on risk-based decisonmaking based on "sound science." Supporters insist that prudence dictates use of "best available" science and opponents argue that only "sound" science can be used. Scientists are caught in the middle. They can provide probabilities and confidence levels but society wants certainty from a field enveloped by uncertainty. As designed, our current policy process is ill-equipped to handle uncertainty and especially to incorporate new and changing knowledge. The question is at what point should we act and how certain should the science be? In other words, when do potential benefits outweigh the potential costs?

As scientists continue to practice their craft, the role of their product-science-is increasingly framed as controversial. This leads us to pose a variety of questions, including:

• How much weight should science be given in establishing Water Quality Standards, Maine Water Classifications, and Total Maximum Daily Loads?
• How can we best balance the demands of society and capabilities of science in policy?
• How can we ensure a transparent separation between risk assessment (science) and risk management (politics) to make more informed and better decisions?
• Should Maine articulate a policy regarding science, uncertainty, and the precautionary principle?
• How can we use science to make better decisions based on effective, efficient, and equitable outcomes?
• How can policy be designed to be more fluid and adaptive to changing science?

¹ Downs, A. (1972) Up and down with ecology: The issue-attention cycle. Public Interest (28)38-51.